We develop a theory wherein the pay of non-CEO executives can be explained by micro-level opportunity structures --the intersection of executives' particular functional positions, CEO background, human capital, and the strategic resource allocation decisions made by the focal firm. Specifically, our framework suggests that executives will be paid more when they occupy positions made visible and important by the actions and resource allocation decisions arising from a firm's strategy, or have a functional background similar to that of the CEO. Moreover, we further suggest that executives' human capital will benefit them most, in terms of pay, when their position helps the firm manage such strategic resource allocations. Support for this multilevel framework is provided using a unique, longitudinal data set that combines survey and archival data on the four highest echelons of senior executives in large U.S. firms.
Executive compensation is an integral component of corporate governance. Indeed, "few such topics on strategic leadership generate the same degree of controversy" (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1996: 263) . The tremendous attention paid to compensation often can be attributed to beliefs that pay affects executives' perceptions of equity and fairness, motivates their behavior and, as a result, should positively influence firm performance and other significant outcomes when managed and set appropriately (Gomez-Mejia & Wiseman, 1997; Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1988; Jensen & Murphy, 1990) . Consequently, understanding the determinants of executive pay is of great theoretical and practical importance.
Most executive compensation research in strategy and organization theory has focused on the pay of the CEO alone, with relatively little attention paid to the compensation of other top executives (Barkema & Gomez-Mejia, 1998; Gomez-Mejia & Wiseman, 1997; Murphy, 1999; and Tosi, Werner, Katz & Gomez-Mejia, 2000) . While important progress has been made to suggest that non-CEO executive pay may reflect such factors as industry, firm size, diversification strategy, firm-specific compensation systems, a manager's relative rank or human capital (Balkin & GomezMejia, 1990; Fisher & Govindarajan, 1992; Galbraith & Merrill, 1991; Leonard, 1990; Main, O'Reilly & Wade, 1993; O'Reilly, Main & Crystal, 1988; Roth & O'Donnell, 1996) , several important questions remain unanswered (Barkema & Gomez-Mejia, 1998) . For instance, how do the resource allocation decisions that result from a firm's strategy differentially impact the pay of its non-CEO executives? Similarly, what influence do CEOs have on the pay of other executives, and who benefits from this influence? And finally, is the effect of human capital on executive pay uniform within the firm, or does it depend on other critical factors? Therefore, the primary objective of this research is to provide a multilevel theoretical framework that begins to answer these questions, and to test it on a unique sample of senior executives in large U.S. firms.
THEORY DEVELOPMENT
As noted above, our interest in studying the pay of senior executives below the level of the CEO is motivated in part by the observation that previous compensation research in strategy and organization theory has focused almost exclusively on chief executive officers (for comprehensive reviews see Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1996; Gomez-Mejia & Wiseman, 1997; Murphy, 1999; and Tosi, et al., 2000) . Although a few studies have examined lower level executive pay in the context of tournaments (Lambert, Larcker & Weigelt, 1993; Main, et al., 1993; O'Reilly, et al., 1988) or frameworks linking firm strategy and human capital to SBU manager pay (Balkin & Gomez-Mejia, 1990; Fisher & Govindarajan, 1992; Galbraith & Merrill, 1991) , research on the determinants of non-CEO executive compensation has all but abated. Indeed, since top executives are typically tasked with implementing strategy and compensation schemes are an integral component of implementation, there remains the practical need to better explain likely determinants of pay.
Most prior theorizing and research on executive compensation has emphasized pay differences across firms, not within firms. For instance, Milkovich, Gerhart and Hannon (1991) showed that non-CEO executives in R&D-intensive industries were paid differently than those in other industries. Gomez-Mejia (1992) similarly reported that diversification strategy affected executive compensation. However, given the sociopolitical nature of pay determination (Barkema & Pennings, 1998; Elhagrasey, Harrison & Buchholz, 1999; Gomez-Mejia & Wiseman, 1997; Westphal, 1998; Westphal & Zajac, 1995) , there is good reason to suspect that executives' pay varies within firms, in addition to across firms. And, perhaps with the exceptions of Balkin and Gomez-Mejia (1990) and Roth and O'Donnell (1996) , little research has examined the conditions giving rise to within-firm differences in executive pay beyond such factors as hierarchical level or title (Leonard, 1990; Main, et al., 1993; O'Reilly, et al., 1988) .
In the following sections, we propose a theoretical framework that describes how executive compensation may be a function of processes operating at multiple levels in the organization. We refer to the outcome of such processes as micro-level opportunity structures, a theoretical construct which we define to fall somewhere between the macro concept of managerial discretion (Finkelstein & Boyd, 1998; Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1990 ) and Zald's fine-grained notion of strategic decision points (1969) . As we demonstrate below, opportunity structures are essentially the result of a confluence of factors and events, and provide particular executives the prospect of greater pay. Our multilevel framework necessarily integrates several theories, but, as a reflection of the sociopolitical nature of pay determination, draws primarily on the upper echelons (a meta theory), and the power and resource dependence perspectives. The upper echelons view provides insights into the potential roles and consequences of executive characteristics like functional background, position, and human capital (Hambrick & Mason, 1984) . Power and resource dependence theory (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1977; Thompson, 1967) allow us to specify when such characteristics are likely to solve critical organizational problems, and thus generate pay opportunities for particular executives.
Specifically, we argue that the salary accompanying an executive's functional position is influenced by a number of organizational factors, including the actions and resource allocation decisions arising from a firm's strategy (like product and international diversification, and investments in advertising, research and development, and plant and equipment), and the functional background of the CEO. Such factors are expected to create micro-level opportunity structures which, in turn, increase incumbents' cash compensation relative to other executives in their firm. It is further proposed that those strategic contingency relationships may be strongest when executives have greater human capital in the form of work experience and education. Although cash compensation is often highly correlated with total pay (and has been reported to generate substantively identical results [Lambert, et al., 1993; Lewellen & Huntsman, 1970; Main, O'Reilly & Wade, 1995] ), we focus on the former because it typically creates less uncertainty for executives than contingent pay schemes (Harris & Helfat, 1997) , and is thus understandably preferred by them (Jensen & Murphy, 1990) . Given the bargaining power that our theory infers for executives, we expect greater cash pay to be the most likely outcome since it reflects executives' preferences and attitudes toward risk (Gomez-Mejia & Wiseman, 1997) . Therefore, cash compensation is the form of pay most conceptually relevant to our theorizing, and is empirically consistent with our tests of the compensation consequences arising from micro-level opportunity structures.
Firm Strategy, Functions, and Executive Cash Compensation
The development of our multilevel theory starts first at the macro level of firm strategy, and then progresses to the more micro antecedents of opportunity structures (CEO and executive characteristics). Following the theorizing of Mintzberg (1978) , and empirical work of Finkelstein and Hambrick (1990) , Geletkanycz and Hambrick (1997) , and Carpenter (2000), we characterize strategy as the pattern resulting from a stream of resource allocation decisions. Such a pattern is comprised, for instance, of a firm's resource allocation choices in research and development, marketing, diversification, capital investments, and international markets. This view follows the strategic choice perspective of Child (1972) wherein the environment places considerable constraints on firms but they also have some latitude to act. Those actions, in turn, may generate fundamentally different ways of allocating resources (Bower, 1970) , as viewed by differences in patterns across firms. In the context of this study, and controlling for other factors, we argue that such fundamental differences between firms are likely to create micro-level opportunity structures which, in turn, lead to compensation differences among executives within firms.
Our argument is supported conceptually by research on resource dependence, and early research on power (a construct integral to the resource dependence perspective). For instance, Thompson observed that jobs represent both "a unit in the organization and a unit in the career of an individual. Joining of the two [is] a result of a bargained agreement…determined through power processes" (1967: 99-116) . Developing that logic, Hickson, Hinings, Lee, Schneck, and Pennings (1971) proposed that power flows to positions which cope with critical contingencies of the firm.
Later, Hambrick (1981) suggested that such contingencies were largely a function of a firm's strategy, and showed that individual executives had high power when their positions coped with the dominant requirements imposed by strategy. Extending Hambrick (1981) , and consistent with our overarching argument, Pfeffer and Davis-Blake (1987) found that the degree to which academic administrators were compensated depended on how critical their function was to the university, vis à vis environmental conditions. Specifically, they reported that athletic directors were more highly paid in public universities than in private ones, and reasoned that those pay differentials occurred because public universities were most dependent on athletic directors for raising funds.
Whereas the above research identified strategic contingencies based on characteristics of a firm's external environment, we focus instead on those demands created by the actual actions and resource allocation decisions underlying a firm's strategy. Nonetheless, the conceptual argument developed above should apply equally well to external or internal firm-created contingencies (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1996; Weick, 1979) . For most firms cash and executive attention are finite resources (Thompson, 1967) , so when considered in relation to other strategic actions, expenditures like R&D, marketing, and capital investment should provide a reasonable indication of a firm's relative reliance or dependence on one functional area of the firm versus others. For instance, Finkelstein and Hambrick (1990: 491) , followed by Geletkanycz and Carpenter (2000) , used such expenditures to identify "important but specific aspects of a firm's strategic profile." And just as a firm's level of product diversification or international diversification have been shown to affect overall CEO and top management team (TMT) member pay (GomezMejia, 1992; Sanders & Carpenter, 1998) , they may be similarly likely to create different functional dependencies or management problems within the firm (Mischel & Hambrick, 1992; Song, 1982) .
Moreover, if certain executives are better positioned to manage or mitigate the problems arising from such strategic resource allocations --by virtue of the responsibility, experience, exposure, and network centrality accruing to them as a consequence of their functional responsibilities --they are likely to be provided with a micro-level opportunity structure that allows them to personally gain in the form of higher compensation. At the very least, and analogous to the positive effect of firm size on CEO pay (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1996; Tosi et al., 2000) , non-CEO executives may similarly benefit when their respective functional areas are relatively large. That view is echoed by Coff (1999) who recently theorized that executives are best poised to bargain for a portion of a firm's profits when their role is clearly associated with strategic interests of the firm.
Again, in our framework, those strategic interests are represented by a firm's significant resource allocation decisions and other strategic actions. Taken in combination, the arguments presented above suggest the following hypothesis:
H1: Executives in functional positions associated with larger strategic resource allocations will receive greater cash compensation than will other executives in their firm.
CEO Background, Executive Proximity, and Cash Compensation
The first level of our theoretical framework concerned the micro-level opportunity structures arising from firm strategy --specifically, the actions and resource allocation decisions that flow from strategy; the second level of our framework seeks to show how opportunity structures arising from CEO functional similarity may also impact the pay of executives in particular functional areas. Management researchers often point to top executives, particularly the CEO, as establishing or reinforcing a firm's sociopolitical climate. This upper echelons perspective integrates theories in organizational behavior, sociocognitive psychology, and social comparison to portray firms as reflections of their top managers (Hambrick & Mason, 1984) . Lending support to that characterization, Song (1982) showed that a CEO's background and prior experience had implications for firm strategy and the selection of other executives. As noted in upper echelons theorizing (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1996) , this latter effect on the choice of executives would be consistent with the notion of attraction-selection-retention (Schneider, 1987) , wherein other executives are hired and rewarded in part due to their similarity to the CEO. Consequently, salient management characteristics like the functional background of a firm's chief executive may actually become imprinted on the organization.
Over time, executive background effects are further reinforced and amplified as CEOs develop distinct routines (Keck & Tushman, 1993) , strong preferences for strategy formulation and implementation (Gabarro, 1987) , "instincts" to protect their bases of power (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1988) , and interest in their professional legacy (Westphal & Zajac, 1995) . Even successor chief executives are often picked, recruited, or promoted based on a perception of fit with extant functional priorities, such that a reinforcing spiral is likely to occur (Michel & Hambrick, 1992; Miles & Snow, 1978) . To the extent that CEOs have been chosen based on their functional experience, or that this experience has consequently shaped the strategy of the firm, then the upper echelons perspective might also be invoked to predict that CEOs will favor, in terms of compensation, departments that represent their particular work experience. At the very least, functional similarity is a determinant of group homogeneity, and has been shown to result in intentional and unintentional favoritism (Schneider, 1987) . Therefore, in our theoretical framework the second micro-level opportunity structure is a consequence of CEO functional background similarity. We suggest the following hypothesis linking chief executive background to executive pay:
H2a: All else equal, executives in functional positions that are similar to the functional background of the CEO will receive greater cash compensation than will other executives in the firm.
The prior hypothesis predicts that an executive's micro-level opportunities for higher pay increase with CEO functional similarity. To the extent that such pay is partially a function of sociopolitical processes (which we and extant research assert to be the case), theory also suggests that higher ranked executives may benefit more from such similarity than lower ranked ones, even among top executives. For instance, prior research has demonstrated that individuals in work groups are more likely to develop respect for each other than those who cross work group boundaries.
Explanations for this observation range from simple propinquity (i.e., hierarchical proximity to the CEO) to the development of shared worldviews as a result of working toward common goals (Baldwin, Bedell, & Johnson, 1997; Krackhardt & Stern, 1988) . We expect the same phenomenon to occur in top management teams because, for the most part, particular executives are afforded greater opportunity to interact with the CEO by virtue of their rank. Similarly, while Hambrick (1995) has noted that top management team members' interests and objectives are typically skewed in favor of their business-unit and functional domains, higher level executives are most likely to have an organizationwide orientation that overlaps that of the CEO, and consequently be perceived as having common interests and objectives. As a result of such regular interaction and common interests, chief executives may more easily rationalize paying some executives more than others.
On the one hand, it could be argued that any compensation benefits arising from CEO propinquity are likely to extend equally to all executives as they rise in rank. For instance, chief executives have great discretion over the pay of other executives (Gomez-Mejia & Wiseman, 1997; Hayward & Hambrick, 1997) , and they may recommend or support higher relative pay for those colleagues they work with most closely. In that view, rank would predict pay differences but functional similarity would not. On the other hand, however, we suggest that pay benefits may be particularly generous for certain executives because hierarchical proximity serves to amplify the positive effects of functional similarity hypothesized in H2a. Such amplification may be further compounded by the complex sociopolitical processes surrounding selection and hierarchy that resulted in the retention of functionally similar executives in the upper echelon (Fligstein, 1987; Ocasio & Kim, 1999; Useem & Karabel, 1986) . In summary we predict that:
H2b: All else equal, the positive effect of functional similarity on cash compensation will be highest for executives occupying levels closest to the level of the CEO.
Strategy, Human Capital, and Executive Cash Compensation
In the third and final level of our theoretical framework, supplementing functional position (H1) and CEO effects (H2a & H2b), we propose that executive pay will also be a function of their individual human capital. Examples of relevant human capital include managerial experience, education, functional expertise, and tenure (Becker, 1962; Hogan & McPheters, 1980) . While human capital is an integral aspect of upper echelons research (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1996) , only a few studies have attempted to test human capital theories in the context of executive pay; most of those have looked primarily at CEO pay (e.g., Harris & Helfat, 1997) .
Among the small number of studies that reported significant human capital effects, Agarwal (1981) found job-related experience to be significantly associated with executive compensation.
Fisher and Govindarajan (1992) similarly reported a weak, but positive relationship between the pay of business-unit managers and years of education. Most recently, Harris and Helfat (1997) showed that work experience gained outside an industry allowed external successor CEOs to garner greater starting cash compensation than within-industry successors. And while there have been several studies investigating the association between CEO tenure and pay from a human capital perspective, no consistent patterns have been found (Deckop, 1988; Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1996; Leonard, 1990; Rajagopalan & Prescott, 1990) . Taken together, this overall lack of empirical support for a human capital proposition has compelled some organizations researchers to conclude that such capital "is unlikely to account for much variance in executive pay" (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1996: 274).
We argue that past research may have been unable to detect stronger linkages between human capital and managerial pay because of inattention to the micro-level opportunity structures in which particular jobs are embedded. More specifically, our theory suggests that human capital may have its strongest impact on pay when individuals are already in positions that have the potential to manage strategic resources for the firm. The superior opportunity structure in such positions allows the individuals occupying them to both exploit the political and social capital accruing to them through their formal position (Burt, 1997; Leonard, 1990) , and to leverage such sociopolitical capital with their existing human capital (i.e., work experience and education), to extract higher salaries.
From both an upper echelons and resource dependence perspective, the micro-level opportunity structures surrounding critical positions will make it more likely that the individuals occupying them will be better positioned to exploit their human capital. This is an important distinction since prior work has emphasized the direct (but weak) effect of human capital on pay (Leonard, 1990) , suggesting that, typically, such effects will be invariant. In contrast, according to our theory individuals in non-critical areas are unlikely to have much leverage in extracting higher salaries regardless of the amount of human capital they possess. The following hypothesis summarizes our opportunity-structure logic:
H3: Executives in functional positions associated with strategic resource allocations will receive greater cash compensation for their human capital (i.e., education and work experience) than will other comparable executives in their firm.
RESEARCH METHOD Sample
The data used in the study were taken from a five-year survey of executives conducted annually by a major compensation consulting company from 1981 to 1985. The human resource department of each participating firm was asked to provide data on approximately 120 individuals at different hierarchical levels in the organization. In order to maximize the time series information available for this study, only those firms that participated in the survey for all five years were included in the sample. While participating firms provided data for individuals in the top 12 levels of an organization, we included only the top four levels to be consistent with definitions of top management teams using in prior executive compensation research (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1996) .
Since the CEO is assigned as the only member of level one, this level was dropped from the sample.
Level 2 includes the most senior executives, a number of whom may sit on the board of directors.
These include job titles such as Chief Operating Officer, Chief Financial Officer, President, and Division President. Level 3 includes the next tier of executives, such as senior and executive vicepresidents. Level 4 includes higher level vice-presidents.
The resulting data base included over 17,135 executive-year observations from 90 large, publicly held S&P 500 firms over the five year period. Executive-level data included base compensation, annual bonus, and salary (base plus bonus), years of education, firm tenure, job tenure, functional responsibilities, and international responsibilities. Following Ocasio and Kim (1999) , data on CEO functional background were taken from Forbes' annual CEO pay survey.
Missing CEO background data were compiled from Duns Reference Book of Corporate Managements. Firm-level financial and other quantitative data were obtained from annual reports and Wharton Research Data Services. Executive cash compensation was lagged one year by gauging it at time t+1 (i.e., salary paid in t+1 plus bonus paid in t+1 based on performance in time t ), while all other variables are gauged in the preceding year at time t.
Dependent Variable
The survey provided data on executives' salaries and bonuses. Consistent with prior research (Harris & Helfat, 1997; Lambert, et al., 1993; Sanders & Carpenter, 1998) , cash compensation for the executives in the sample was computed as the sum of base salary and annual bonus. The sum was then logged so that extreme values would not bias the results. While cash compensation provides the best test of our theoretical model, as a practical matter no information on the amount of contingent pay (such as stock options) was available at the time of the survey, nor was it required for public disclosure (and even today it is only disclosed for the top five highest paid executives).
Independent Variables
Hypotheses H1, H2a, and H2b predict that executives' functional positions will interact with strategic resource allocations or CEO background to affect their pay. While researchers often make attributions about the nature of an executive's work experience and social position based on their functional department in the organization (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1996; Hambrick & Mason, 1984) that spend a large amount of their time dealing with international issues. Consequently, we coded individuals as being international if they reported having any international responsibilities, part-or full-time. Overall, these categories are consistent with those used more generally in upper echelons research, where each TMT member is designated as being from a particular functional background (Bantel & Jackson, 1989; Keck, 1997; Wiersema & Bantel, 1992) .
In order to measure the traditional forms of human capital, for hypothesis H3 and control variables, we gauged executives' levels of education and work experience. Education was simply measured as years of formal education. Thus, those with a high school education would have 12 years of education while those that stopped after completing their undergraduate degree would be coded as having 16 years of education. We computed work experience using the following formula:
Work Experience equals Age minus Education minus 6. We assumed that individuals started their formal education at age six and began working immediately after completing their education. As we noted earlier, there is some evidence that work experience and education are related to salary levels.
Although organizations research has portrayed firm tenure as a measure of human capital (i.e., firm specific work experience [Leonard, 1990] ), we found no substantive differences between the effects of firm tenure or our variable. Consequently, results are presented using the measure of work experience described above. As discussed below, following the logic that human capital earns increasing returns up to a point, after which the marginal returns to it begin to fall (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1996; Mincer, 1970) , the effects of both education and work experience were modeled with squared terms to account for their likely curvilinear effects on pay (i.e., inverted "U" shape).
Strategic Contingency Variables
Hypothesis H1 predicts that the actions and resource allocation choices underlying a firm's strategy will moderate the relationship between executives' positions and their cash compensation; hypothesis H3, in turn, suggests such strategic actions and choices will determine the value of executives' human capital. To test both those sets of interactions we examined four categories of strategic resource allocations: (1) financial (logged value of capital expenditures and absolute level of diversification calculated as the number of four-digit SIC codes reported by the firm), (2) marketing (logged value of advertising expenses), (3) research & development (logged value of R&D expenses), and (4) international (logged value of foreign sales). Admittedly, these categories are not exhaustive but organizations research suggests that they tap into critical aspects of firms' value chains and strategies, and are often cited to be among those most critical strategic determinants of firm success and survival (Gomez-Mejia, 1992; Hambrick, 1990 and 1996; Guthrie & Datta, 1998; Henderson & Fredrickson, 1986; Porter, 1985; Sanders & Carpenter, 1998; Song, 1982) .
In general, the larger the value of the strategic resource allocation variables, the greater firms' relative dependence on their respective functional areas (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1990; Hambrick, 1981) . Contingency relationships were identified intuitively, with specific executive functions linked to those contingencies that appeared most relevant to them. For example, our framework predicts that the finance function should be critical to capital intensive or highly diversified firms (Melone, 1995; Song, 1982) . Similarly, the marketing function should be most valuable in firms that devote large amounts of resources to marketing and advertising (Bowman & Daniels, 1995; Chaganti & Sambharya, 1987) ; executives in R&D are expected to be most valuable to firms that spend a large amount of resources in developing new and innovative products (Chaganti & Sambharya, 1987) .
Finally, positions with international responsibilities may be particularly important in firms that have significant overseas sales (Carpenter, Sanders & Gregersen, 2001; Sambharya, 1996) .
For hypothesis H1, specific interaction variables were created by multiplying an executive's functional background by the relevant strategic resource allocations following the pairing procedure described above. For hypothesis H3, multiplicative interactions were created between education and work experience and the respective contingency by function --this latter procedure is described more fully in the results section.
CEO Functional Background Similarity
To test the effects of CEO functional background/executive functional position similarity on executive pay (hypotheses H2a and H2b), we created a dummy variable where 1 equals "CEO same," and 0 equals "different." Forbes annual compensation survey categorizes CEO functional background among categories ranging from "Administrative" to "Technical." The survey identifies a single background for each CEO. Based on initial analysis of our sample, potential areas of similarity existed in ten Forbes categories, which we clustered as follows: (a) administration, (b) finance and investments, (c) legal, (d) operations, (e) research and development, and (f) retail, sales, and marketing. While the determination of CEO functional background similarity between the Forbes survey and the numerical job code listings from our survey data was relatively objective and straightforward, we took the additional precaution of using two raters. No disagreements of substance emerged, and the two reviewers reached full agreement on the final coding scheme.
Control Variables
We controlled for firm size (total assets) and prior performance (return on equity). Large, highperforming firms may pay their executives most. Because human capital has been cited as a potential determinant of executive pay, we also controlled for work experience and education level using main-effect and squared terms (as described above [Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1996; Mincer, 1970] ). We similarly controlled for the main-effects of executives' functional positions (i.e., finance, marketing, R&D, and international) for the reason that external labor markets for those functions may have unobserved effects on pay (Pfeffer & Davis-Blake, 1987) . Since the CEO-same variable was calculated using other functional backgrounds in addition to those above, as an added precaution we also controlled for administrative, law, and operations and productions positions using dummy codes for each in tests of hypotheses H2a and H2b. Leonard (1990) suggested that human capital influences executive pay indirectly, as opposed to directly, by serving as an internal sorting criterion. Thus, human capital provides an entrée to higher ranks in the organization, which in turn results in higher pay. To address this issue we controlled for executives' organizational rank using dummy codes for levels two and three (excluding level one, the CEO); level 4 was the omitted category. We also created four dummy variables to control for potential period (year) effects; the first year was the excluded year. Finally, in addition to those variables mentioned above, all strategic contingency variables used to calculate the interactions are retained as controls.
Analyses
We tested the hypotheses by estimating fixed-effects models using STATA statistical software. Fixed-effects modeling controls for unobserved differences between firms. The STATA fixed-effects algorithm generates a dummy variable for each firm and this controls for constant, unmeasured differences among firms that may explain differences in the dependent variable (Greene, 1990) . For instance, because economists have long observed that some firms pay very highly across all positions, while the pay of other firms for comparable positions is very low (high wage vs. low wage firms), or have particular evaluation systems in place which reinforce pay differentials, the inclusion of firm controls is important because it accounts for these otherwise unobserved effects. Industry dummies are similarly not included in the fixed-effects time series models because industry membership is constant across each firm during the period studied. As noted above, across-year effects are accounted for using year dummy variables.
Importantly, fixed-effects modeling does not control for potential problems arising from autocorrelation (i.e., nonindependence), and this could indeed bias our results since many executives are observed more than once in the sample (that is, they reappear each year). Employing a fixedeffects model at the executive level would prove unsatisfactory since many executive characteristics such as functional background seldom vary year to year (and hence the potential problem of autocorrelation), thus preventing the completion of any analytical algorithms. Recognizing these difficulties, we conducted an extremely conservative test in which we randomly sampled one executive from each level, from each firm, for each year, and ran our regression analyses on this reduced random sample. For the human capital analyses we randomly sampled one executive from each level, within each function, for each firm, for each year. For all of the hypotheses we repeated this random sampling procedure 10 times, and compared the results across each run.
The conclusions drawn from the outcome of such a procedure are similar to that generated by using Quadratic Assignment Procedure (QAP [Hubert, 1987] ), which has been used by other researchers to investigate nonindependent relationships (Krackhardt, 1987; Gulati, 1995; Haunschild & Miner, 1997) . The common underlying premise is to determine whether results using the full sample are, or are not, an artifact of nonindependent observations. Our results using the random procedure were substantively unchanged (i.e., sign, size, and significance of each coefficient, and variance explained) from those using the full sample. Therefore, it appears that the results validating our theoretical framework, reported below, are not simply an artifact of autocorrelation and the nonindependence of executive observations. Table 1 provides descriptive statistics and correlations among the variables. In Table 2 we report tests of hypotheses H1, H2a, and H2b. While all analyses account for period effects (year), results for those four control variables are omitted from the tables in order to conserve space. As expected, in this sample higher ranking executives were paid more than those in lower ranks, and average pay increased with calendar year.
RESULTS
[Insert Tables 1 and 2 About Here] Model 1 in Table 2 reports the effects of our control variables. Consistent with prior research, firm size and performance have positive effects on compensation. This model also shows that the human capital measures (i.e., work experience and education) are curvilinearly associated with pay for the firms in our sample. Specifically, the positive main effects and negative squared term effects suggest an inverted "U" shaped relationship. The dummy variables for all the position functions are similarly significant. Controlling for executive rank and compared to other functions, the coefficients suggest that marketing positions earn most, followed in order by international, R&D, and finance. Finally, with the exception of capital expenditures, the other strategy contingencies also impact average executive cash compensation for the sampled firms. Since we already accounted for firm size and performance in the regressions (along with our other controls), the proxy effects reported for the financial, marketing, R&D, and international contingencies are independent of those controls. Interestingly, international sales, R&D intensity, and advertising intensity all have positive effects on salary levels, while diversification has a negative impact. Table 2 reports the tests of hypothesis H1 --namely, that executives would be paid most when they occupied critical functional positions, as determined by actions and resource allocations underlying firm strategy. To test this hypothesis we created multiplicative terms to capture the interaction of the strategic contingency variables with each executive's department. For instance, where we predict that executives in finance positions are likely to be paid more, relative to other executives in firms facing high levels of diversification or capital intensity, a multiplicative interaction was created with finance and each of these latter contingency variables to create two new interaction variables. Our hypothesis will be supported for each contingency prediction when the coefficient for the interaction variable is positive and significant, while specifying the main effects of the variables used to create it.
Model 2 in
Since the results were substantively unchanged when each interaction was tested in separate models, we report only the fully-specified model containing all interactions. The capital expenditures interaction was significant and positive in the individual models, but was not significant in the full model. Every other interaction is significant, and all but one is in the predicted direction.
Finance executives are paid more in highly diversified firms; marketing and R&D managers are similarly likely to benefit when in advertising and R&D-intensive firms, respectively. These effects are quite substantial. For example, R&D executives in R&D-intensive firms (which we define as being at the 75 th percentile) receive 12% pay premiums as compared to their counterparts in firms that have lower R&D expenditures (at the median level). Similarly, the salaries of finance executives in highly diversified firms are also 10% higher than those in firms that sell in only a few productmarkets. In contrast, while international responsibilities translate into greater pay overall (i.e., positive main effect), this relationship is negative along with increases in international sales. Therefore, except for the results for international sales and capital expenditures, hypothesis H1 is supported.
In supplemental analyses (not reported) we tested for the possibility that other interactions (beyond our theoretical model) between executive functions and contingencies better explained executive pay. Such a test provides additional evidence that (1) the function/contingency match-ups were appropriate and, (2) selected strategic actions and resource allocation choices resulted in higher pay for the functions we identified, as opposed to executives in all functions. For instance, in the model testing the interaction between R&D intensity and research positions, we added the three other possible functional interactions with R&D intensity (i.e., finance position, marketing position, and international responsibility). We repeated these steps for each contingency domain (i.e., financial, marketing, R&D, and international). In all cases, our theorized interactions explained more variance in pay than the additional posthoc interactions. Moreover, in most cases the supplemental interactions were not significant; in a few cases the posthoc interactions were negative and significant (i.e., finance executives received less pay in marketing and R&D-intensive firms).
Taken together, these results validate our choice of focal interactions, and the general contention that firms make tradeoffs among resource allocation choices (i.e., a fixed pie), and such tradeoffs differentially affect executive pay within the firm.
Hypothesis H2a predicted that executives who are in functions similar to the functional background of the CEO will receive higher cash compensation. Recall that the CEO background variable was coded as 1 to signify such similarity; otherwise it was coded as 0. We also controlled for the other position variables used to calculate CEO-same, but were excluded from our strategic contingency predictions. The positive, significant coefficient for the CEO similarity variable in Model 3 provides support for hypothesis H2a. The magnitude of this effect is modest, however, in that executives who are in functions similar to the background of the CEO receive, on average, a 3% pay premium.
To test hypothesis H2b, which predicted that proximity would positively moderate the effects of CEO functional similarity on executive pay, we created two multiplicative interactions by interacting the CEO similarity variable with each of the dummy variables representing executive hierarchical rank. When these two additional interactions were added in Model 4, only the interaction coefficient for the highest level (i.e., level 2) was significant. Moreover, since the significant coefficient is positive, support is provided for hypothesis H2b. The main effect for CEO functional similarity is somewhat weaker, but remains positive and significant. From a practical standpoint, executives received a pay premium of nearly 7% when they were in functions similar to the CEO's background and proximate in level. Thus, as predicted, the positive effect of CEO functional similarity is clearly strongest for those executives closest in rank to the chief executive officer.
Finally, the combined results for the CEO similarity variables and all contingency interactions are presented in Model 5. Support for hypotheses H1, H2a, and H2b are reaffirmed in this complete model. However, the coefficient for CEO functional similarity is lower than that reported in Model 4 (though still explains over 6% of executive pay). Therefore, the relationship between CEO similarity and executive pay appears to be both direct, and indirect (i.e., partially mediated) through executive proximity and the strategic contingencies facing the firm and its top managers.
Hypothesis H3 suggested that executives' education and work experience would have the strongest effect on their salaries when they were in positions that dealt with strategic resource allocations. In order to test this hypothesis we partitioned the data to create four subsamples composed of (1) executives in finance positions, (2) executives in marketing positions, (3) executives in research and development positions, and (4) executives with international responsibilities. For each group we reestimated our cash compensation models and interacted the key strategic allocation for a given group with our human capital measures. Because the effects of our human capital variables are nonlinear (i.e., squared terms), it was further necessary to control for the additional possible two-way interactions created by a component of the squared term and the respective strategic contingency.
[Insert Tables 3a-3d (Table 3a) and between both education, work experience, and advertising intensity (Table 3b ) were significant but with mixed signs; the education interactions and the squared work experience variable and foreign sales was also significant (Table 3d ). While such relationships may suggest support for H3, it is necessary to decompose and then graph the effects of the human capital variables at high and low levels of the strategic contingency variables in order to determine if the hypothesis was ultimately supported.
Given that the contingency interactions contain squared terms, graphing the functional form of the interactions is likely to reveal that the relationships between human capital and strategic contingencies are nonlinear.
To first decompose the interactions, we designated strategic contingency values as low or high using the median and 75 th percentile values, respectively. As an example, median advertising intensity was $25 million (constant 1980 dollars) and $340 million for those in the 75 th percentile among the firms in our sample. Such decomposition based on median values revealed that within finance, marketing, and international positions, executives earned significantly higher returns from their human capital when they were in positions made critical to the firm as a result of the actions and resource allocation choices underlying its strategy. Details on these decomposition calculations are provided in the Appendix; additional references are provided in Jaccard, Turrisi and Wan (1990) .
For instance, comparisons among low and high advertising firms showed that marketing executives earned up to 14% more for their work experience than peer marketing executives when they were in advertising-intensive firms. Such strategic contingency-based pay differences were considerably higher among finance executives (facing capital expenditures and diversification contingencies), and considerably lower among executives with international responsibilities (peak pay difference of 6%).
No human capital-based differences were detected among R&D executives.
To even better understand the functional form of the contingent relationships suggested above, we graphed the effects of the human capital contingency interactions on cash compensation over the entire range of human capital variables. Such graphing revealed that the finance and international human capital effects were a gradually increasing function of their respective strategic contingency. Specifically, at low levels of education and work experience the marginal effect of human capital on pay among executives in the finance and international subsamples was negligible; the strongest positive relationships were detected at the high ends of education (12 years) and work experience (35 years). For instance, executives with international responsibilities gained no premium for their work experience when it totaled less than five years, even in highly global firms. In contrast, executives in those same firms with 35 years of work experience garnered 6% higher pay as a result of their work experience than comparable others when their firms had large foreign sales.
The effects of human capital were similarly striking for marketing executives --even after controlling for the main effects of human capital, those executives realized greater returns to their education and work experience along with increases in the marketing contingency. For example, marketing executives in marketing-intensive firms with two years of work experience earned 4% more for an equivalent amount of work experience than their functional counterparts; that pay spread grew to 10% with 12 years of work experience, up to a maximum premium of 18% after 26 years, and gradually leveling off thereafter. Therefore, the results of decomposition and graphing suggest some support for hypothesis H3 and, when taken in combination with the tests of hypotheses H1, H2a, and H2b, corroborate the prediction that position, strategic resource allocations, and human capital create micro-level opportunity structures for executives, which they in turn translate into higher relative pay.
DISCUSSION
The primary purpose of this paper was to introduce micro-level opportunity structures and test a multilevel theory of executive compensation. Using the complementary lenses of upper echelons, resource dependence, and power theories, we predicted that the confluence of executive positions, strategic contingencies, CEO characteristics, and human capital would lead to micro-level opportunity structures, which in turn could afford particular executives with higher pay. We found a consistent pattern of results to support that prediction, and provided robust empirical validation for our overarching theoretical framework. Specifically, executives received greater cash compensation when they occupied positions where they were likely to be associated with strategic resource allocation choices made by their firm, and had functional responsibilities similar to the background of the CEO. Given the particular resource allocations arising as a result of firm strategy, we also demonstrated that executives were able to garner greater returns to their education and work experience in some cases. Taken together, our theory of micro-level opportunity structures and supporting results offer a partial set of answers to recent calls for "a better understanding of what determines executive pay" (Barkema & Gomez-Mejia, 1998: 143) . The implications of our study for theory and future research are discussed below.
Implications of Results
Overall, the pattern of results reported here contributes to our theoretical understanding of the upper echelons, resource dependency, and power, by demonstrating how organizational and individual characteristics intersect to affect executive pay. An emerging upper echelons perspective holds that executives, primarily CEOs, are compensated for the criticality of the tasks that they must manage (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1988; Henderson & Fredrickson, 1996) . Similarly, it is reasonable to expect that such relationships extend to the pay of other executives throughout the firm.
However, while that perspective has typically emphasized the external and macro-level determinants of pay (i.e., environment, firm size, corporate strategy), this study showed how the many faces of firm strategy (i.e., actions and resource allocation choices) may result in different internal resource dependencies, and thus have different pay implications for particular executives. Furthermore, we showed that executives themselves vary in the position and human capital requisite to managing the contingencies arising from differences in leadership (like CEO background) and strategic resource allocations. Consequently, functional position along with education and work experience, created certain micro-level opportunity structures that executives converted into higher pay.
The majority of results for executive compensation confirmed our theorizing on the importance of executives' position, in conjunction with strategic resource allocations and CEO similarity (i.e., H1 -H2b); however, the negative interaction of international responsibility with foreign sales (Table 2 ) was entirely opposite of our prediction. That counterintuitive result can be explained, perhaps, by a social capital perspective (Burt, 1997) . For instance, the literature on expatriates suggests that foreign assignments are often a risky career move for both executives and their firms, and that the time spent gaining international experience has the concomitant cost of less political clout back at headquarters. In some ways, expatriates may face micro-level liability structures, as opposed to opportunity structures. Certainly, it has been consistently shown that U.S.
expatriates are "out of sight, and out of mind" during international assignments (Lancaster, 1995) , which may negatively impact executives' social capital at headquarters. A related explanation for the observed interaction may be that none of our sampled firms realized greater than 30% of their revenues overseas. Thus, coupled with international executives' already low levels of social capital, they may also wield much less "expert" power when their firms have only a small stake in nondomestic markets.
The human capital hypothesis (H3) also received support. Even though it was important that we demonstrate some human capital effects, in terms of micro-level opportunity structures, a more critical hurdle was the need to show that such capital could explain more than marginal variance in executive pay. We believe that we succeeded in that endeavor. Indeed, executives earned significantly greater returns to their education and work experience in capital and advertising intensive firms (over 18%), while those with international responsibilities earned up to 6% premiums for their work experience, in conjunction with increases in their respective strategic contingencies. Our results for non-CEO executives complement those of Harris and Helfat (1997) , who theorized and found that external replacement CEOs from outside the industry would be able to bargain for greater cash pay since their presumed lack of both firm-and industry-specific human capital puts them at greater risk. In contrast, consistent with the notion of micro-level opportunity structures, we showed how firm-specific human capital (like functional position) could serve to leverage general human capital such as education and work experience when executives' functions were associated with critical contingencies created by the firm.
Future Research Directions
Our study has left some questions unanswered, suggesting future research opportunities.
Four of these questions are particularly important. For instance, the survey data constrained the study to a period spanning the early to mid-1980s. While this may be a practical limitation of the data set, we have been unable to answer the question as to whether our results generalize to the present. At a fundamental level, we expect our construct of micro-level opportunity structures to generalize well to other periods since it incorporates the basic tension that firms manage contingencies and resources through people, and those people are able to bargain for the price of their services. Based on the changing face of corporate America, and perhaps the drivers of the opportunity structures that we identified, arguments could be made that our results would be different in contemporary firms, or that changing contingencies would result in different distributions of pay across functions. The latter argument is consistent with the literature on circulation of control in large public corporations (Fligstein, 1987; Ocasio & Kim, 1999) .
A related limitation of our data is that it provided information only on cash compensation, and not other long-term forms of pay such as stock options, which would have allowed us to use total pay as a dependent variable. As a practical matter, stock options were not a common component of non-CEO executive pay in the early 1980s. However, compensation studies conducted with data prior to ours (Lewelleyn & Huntsman, 1970) , contemporary with it (Main, et al., 1995) , and after it (Lambert et al., 1993) have shown cash pay to be so highly correlated with total pay that the former is an adequate proxy for the latter (Gomez-Mejia, 1994) . Researchers are still divided as to the reliability of estimating the value of long-term compensation (the component of pay not included in our data), since such estimates are based on a series of complex mathematical assumptions that are not entirely met (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1996: 303; Gomez-Mejia, 1994; Kerr & Kren, 1992) . Regardless, valid research questions remain as to whether and how the relationships found in this study would be reflected in executive pay when long-term incentives have been fully accounted for, or during periods when cash pay is not a reliable proxy for total compensation.
The second and third questions concern causality and firm performance, respectively.
Indeed, although we used a lag structure and control variables that allow us to suggest causal relationships between executives' positions, human capital, and pay, we have not established
causality. An alternative motivation may be that, when filling critical positions, firms are more apt to hire "better-qualified" individuals. In those cases, executives will be paid more than others in the firm for reasons beyond the human capital we identified. Such an interpretation does not really provide an alternative theoretical explanation, but instead suggests one possible mechanism by which critical positions are filled.
Also implicit in our theoretical model is the notion that executives benefit from their unique position, in part, because they are able to translate their micro-level opportunity structures into competitive advantage for the firm. Indeed, our argument could be partially an economic one, wherein executives garner a portion of the profits they are expected to generate for the firm by virtue of their position and background (Coff, 1999; Hitt, Bierman, Shimizu & Kochhar, 2001 ). Nonetheless, we have been able to show that the importance of a position or human capital can be determined, at least in part, absent an assessment of the performance consequences of such importance. However, perspectives such as agency theory suggest that compensation schemes can serve to align the interests of managers and shareholders (Jensen & Murphy, 1990) . Therefore, it is still valuable to understand better whether some executives actually apply their position and human capital to the betterment of their firms' financial performance, and whether the pay differentials we observed are a consequence or determinant of the alignment of position, skills, and performance (Jensen & Murphy, 1990) .
A fourth avenue for research arises from the fact that we did not actually measure executives' behaviors, abilities, or individual differences, but instead inferred them from their backgrounds, positions, years of education, and work experience. As a result, by following the norms of past upper echelons and resource dependence research, we have "black-boxed" important underlying processes and causal mechanisms that may have been otherwise interesting or significant to our arguments. Research is missing that would establish a direct link between such factors and the background characteristics and outcomes that we measured. While our theory on micro-level opportunity structures may imply that executives take some action (i.e., actively bargain) to realize greater pay, it is also possible that they simply benefited from being in the right place at the right time. Such a possibility does not deny the existence of micro-level opportunity structures, but instead raises questions about the relative influence on them by factors beyond non-CEO executives' control, versus by the executives themselves. Therefore, studies are needed to illuminate the relationships among firm strategies, executive positions and characteristics, and the actual cognitions and behaviors of executives.
Conclusion
In conclusion, this study contributes to the organization and strategy literatures by integrating them and advancing prior work on both. Specifically, by developing the notion of microlevel opportunity structures, our research inserts position and human capital into the discussion of non-CEO executive compensation, and suggests that executives' functional positions and backgrounds play a significant role in the degree to which they realize pay advantages. We have demonstrated the importance of studying executive compensation beyond the top five highest-paid executives, and we have explored the distinct yet complementary roles of strategic contingencies, CEO similarity, and human capital which determine the degree to which executive compensation varies within firms. Indeed, by studying the notion that executives' bargaining power is contingent upon the actions and resource allocation choices underlying firms' strategies (which in turn generate micro-level opportunity structures), we hope we have suggested fruitful new avenues for organizations and strategy research. Although our work has clearly shown that there are limits to the impact of position and human capital on executive pay, it also suggests that such factors can continue to play a valuable role in research on corporate governance and top management teams in the context of complex organizations. Wrk. Exp^2 X Advertising Intensity -.000 ** (.00) -.000 ** (.00) Adjusted R-square .31 * .31 * .32 * n=3124, **p<.01, *p<.05, †p< .10, two-tailed tests with the exception of interactions **Summary tables are provided to preserve space: All models reported above also include controls for year, executive rank, total assets (log), prior ROE, capital intensity, diversification, advertising intensity, R&D intensity, foreign sales intensity, and CEO-similarity. Results of control models are available upon request of the authors. Adjusted R-square .33 * .33 * .33 * n=923, **p<.01, *p<.05, †p< .10, two-tailed tests with the exception of interactions **Summary tables are provided to preserve space: All models reported above also include controls for year, executive rank, total assets (log), prior ROE, capital intensity, diversification, advertising intensity, R&D intensity, foreign sales intensity, and CEO-similarity. Results of control models are available upon request of the authors.
